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Abstract 
When questions are asked about how the civil service is preparing for policy development and 
delivery beyond Brexit, it appears that there are activities being undertaken within Ministerial 
view and those, according to Jill Rutter of the Institute of Government, that are more likely to 
be submerged out of Ministerial sight. While the preparations for Brexit appear to be 
dominating Whitehall’s attention, particularly but not exclusively in the lead departments of 
DExEU, the Treasury and No 10, there is also some evidence that preparation for initiatives 
that the UK might have expected to implement in the next EU programme period 2021-2027 
continue to be made. These include new approaches in transport policy, multi level 
governance, strategic planning and affordable housing. While many of these policy and 
implementation initiatives are not specifically identified with an EU policy within their 
domestic framing, as is the custom and practice of the UK civil service, their use of common 
language identifiers and outcomes suggests otherwise. Further, close discussion and 
engagement with officials working on these policies fix their EU provenance. This paper will 
examine the context for this policy continuity and discuss whether these actions are related 
to an approach to risk mitigation against a ‘no’ Brexit scenario emerging or whether they 
represent an auto-pilot response from civil servants and departments that have largely been 
left to their own devices outside the wider Brexit focus currently dominating government. A 
further issue may be that this approach represents a denial of a Brexit outcome by officials in 
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the longer term. This paper offers an opportunity to consider the role of the civil service within 
the context of Brexit and its response to preparations for the future. 
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Introduction 
Following her appointment as Prime Minister (PM) after the Brexit referendum in June 2016, 
Theresa May introduced some institutional changes to the Government’s departmental 
structure using the machinery of government to create two new Departments. The 
Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU) was established to lead the 
Government’s negotiations with the European Commission which had appointed a lead 
negotiator. This Department was to sit alongside the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
partly to develop a knowledgeable negotiating team and partly to offset criticisms of the leave 
members of the Conservative party who vociferously expressed the view that the FCO was 
strongly in favour of remaining and was using its advice to promote a softer Brexit. The second 
new department was the Department for International Trade (DfIT) which was established 
with the purpose of developing more trade with countries outside the EU so that agreements 
could be signed immediately the UK leaves the EU. DfIT was established through the 
international trade teams existing in Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
(DBEIS) which was then given an internal focus of preparing an Industrial strategy that would 
support the UK economy through the Brexit process and after in the world markets.  
 
The creation of these departments was an outward and visible sign of preparation for Brexit 
which was designed to provide some confidence and sense of direction despite the 
uncertainty of the PM’s negotiating position. However, these new departments were not 
solely in control, of the Brexit negotiation processes. Within the centre of government, the 
core executive comprising of Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) and the Cabinet Office (CO), 
particularly through its European secretariat remained in the policy lead for negotiations 
behind the scenes. At the same time the FCO maintained its responsibilities for gaining 
intelligence through its networks of missions throughout the EU and the rest of the world. 
While HMT and the CO could be expected to play roles that were distant and remained within 
their existing spheres of competence, the role of the CO European secretariat is less well 
known. Within the core executive, it has been the CO that has been the pivot between 
managing negotiations between the UK and EU on major policy and programmes and then 
determining how these policies should be implemented by the operational departments. The 
CO has been responsible for determining an overriding narrative that would suit the political 
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ideology of the prevailing government or preparing policies that would be attractive to 
members of an incoming government should a general election be expected to change 
national party control. They have also been responsible for selecting the methods of delivery 
and compliance which operational departments have then put into effect. 
 
The role of the CO’s European secretariat came to prominence when they were responsible 
for producing a number of the reports on the balance of competences prior to the UK ‘s 
negotiations on leaving the EU in conjunction with the FCO (FCO 2012). In their role of 
determining how the UK’s EU commitments for delivery of legislation and policy programmes 
within the UK, the CO has also been concerned with the delivery within a devolved UK.  
Scotland and Wales are responsible for the determination of the delivery of these EU 
programmes to a greater or lesser degree and this has been their foremost role since their 
devolution institutions were established. The responsibilities of the devolved administrations 
in relation to the EU legislation and programmes was set out in their foundational legislation 
which was anchored on EU principles of subsidiarity. At the same time the delivery 
departments in Whitehall also had a role in applying this policy and legislation. For DEFRA, 
like the devolved administrations, the delivery role has been clear not least because the UK’s 
pooling of agriculture and fisheries within the EU has been clear from the outset. Farmers 
have both received payments through the Common Agricultural policy but have also been 
operating within EU agreed methods of working and regulation in open ways. Similarly, the 
Common Fisheries policy has been overt and made more public through its vociferous lobby 
to return fishing in British waters to UK control from the outset in when the UK joined the EU 
in 1972.  
In addition to these overt relationships between government departments and EU agreed 
policy delivery, there has also been a second approach where the CO has used post political 
methods including statecraft and scalecraft to be more opaque about the EU derivation of 
policy and its delivery. In 2010, the PSA and the Institute for Government held a poll of which 
policies had been most successful in the UK since 1980. While not being recognised in the 
selection of these policies and their subsequent discussion, Morphet (2013) found that all top 
ten policies had been agreed for delivery by the UK within the EU. They represented a 
demonstration of pooled competencies in practice. 
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It is not only in these policies where there has been an obscured approach to delivery, 
particularly within England. Here the CO has also been responsible for the packaging of these 
UK/EU commitments in forms that could be implemented through the delivery departments 
of government. In managing this style of submerged delivery, the policies have been detached 
from their EU provenance and set within a policy narrative that has found ways to deliver 
them through a domestic policy agenda. Such has been the success of this approach that 
neither civil servant’s delivering these policies and programmes and those engaged in civil 
society and tiers of government have no understanding of their sources and would deny this 
if questioned on these issues. Further, this opaque approach has been protected by an anti-
EU culture and a discouragement from raising these wider issues within policy debates.  The 
EU provenance of policy and legislation is not mentioned in policy documents or discussions 
not only form government but also form think thanks such as the Institute for Government.  
 
This domestic appropriation of EU policy narratives is different from other countries in the EU 
where there is much more public knowledge of policies and programmes. This was clearly 
demonstrated during the Brexit referendum when, on TV and radio programmes, politicians 
and experts from other member states were using as common parlance the way different EU 
programmes were operating, their objectives and outcomes which clearly had no meaning 
for the UK journalists and commentators in these discussions.  
 
This opaque culture has particularly been apparent in two delivery departments – the 
Department for Transport (DfT) and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
Government (MHCLG). This has meant that it is something of a problem for the CO to 
suddenly move from an opaque to an overt approach EU policy within these departments to 
prepare for Brexit. These departments have had a specific core team established to work on 
Brexit preparation issues as far as they understand them in relation to their core functions. 
As Owen and Lloyd (2018) have shown, most Government Departments have increased their 
Brexit teams through specific recruitment to these roles, maintaining a separation from what 
is regarded as the core business of the Department. Further, such is the distance in 
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understanding between the MHCLG’s understanding of the relationship between UK/EU 
policies being delivered by the Ministry, that it has not requested any funds for additional 
staff to work on Brexit from HMT. 
At the same time, the other departmental staff, in the clear majority in each case, have been 
told that they need to operate within a ‘business as usual’ model. If it has been impossible to 
reveal to these departments to the extent to which their policies and programmes have been 
directly linked with the UK’s agreements made within the EU, this would require significant 
changes in departmental culture. This is an issue within DfT and MHCLG where a high 
proportion of their policy and delivery activity is within areas where the UK has pooled within 
the EU. In the DfT this is almost 100% and for MHCLG, it has been less with polices such as 
housing and planning being outside EC areas of competence and UK/EU agreements. 
However, the changes in the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, where the EC has now a lead role in 
territorial cohesion and the recent agreement on the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals 
(2016) across all EU member states has now brought both planning and housing to the table 
for future policy development and legislation at EU level.  
 
EU policy development and delivery: the use of programme cycles 
When approaching policy and delivery of programmes, the EU operates in 7-year cycles. 
These are most commonly understood at key points when there are changes in the 
appointment of Commissioners by each member state. Less well recognised within the UK is 
that this considered within the setting of a budget (usually known as the Multi Annual 
Financial Framework or MAFF) and the future work programme for the next seven years. This 
process of budgeting and associated delivery programmes is overseen by the President of the 
European Commission when appointed for this term. As Goetz and Meyer-Sahling (2009) 
demonstrate, the temporal components of these seven-year programmes are essential as a 
mechanism to allow the resetting of policies within members states to be associated with 
national elections – usually on five-year terms - to allow for their implementation mechanisms 
to be established and start delivery.  
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While these programmes have been negotiated within the member states before being 
finalised and agreed within EC Directorates General (DGs), are being increasingly criticised for 
their silo modes of operation (Trondal 2011).  Following the Lisbon Treaty, there have been 
moves to reduce the barriers to delivery that are associated with these silos (Borras 2009) to 
bring together those policies and programmes in the pursuit of integration. One of the policy 
areas that has been selected to increase integration has been the policies and programmes   
that operate at sub state levels into common programmes that can increasingly be managed 
within single, programming processes at the local level (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2013). 
Here there is an expectation that the programmes with be operated within the two principles 
of subsidiarity and fairness and have been significant in developing the EU direct relationships 
across the EU at sub state level. However, these seven-year programmes also operate in other 
more strategic programmes with longer delivery timescales such as the Trans-European 
networks which have time horizons of 2030 and 2050.  
 
It is also the case that while the member states (MS) are implementing these programmes, 
the EC together with the MS are preparing for the subsequent programme. Unlike the UK, the 
EU has a cumulative approach to policy and legislation (Morphet 2013) that is sometimes 
desired as being ‘geological’ (Connelly 2017). In this approach, most frequently exemplified 
in the preambles to all EU policy and legislation, is the Biblical Old Testament line of descent 
from the foundational treaties of any specific action undertaken by the EU institutions, 
generally started with the word ‘whereas’. Further, at the same time as the EC are preparing 
for the next programme period so are member states attempting to influence the ways that 
these programmes are devised, including their priorities and their mechanisms for delivery. 
While having a key priority included in the next programme period is significant for any 
member state, the chosen method of delivery is also important. Here there will be benefits 
of not having to apply political capital to implement agreed programmes. Where the EC uses 
a member state’s method of delivery, it will be possible to rely on existing state delivery 
mechanisms. There are also benefits in terms of new policy adoption and transition costs to 
member states which can be avoided in the EC adopts the existing approach in any individual 
member state. Further, if a current methodology is adopted by the EC there are opportunities 
for the that member state to offer consultancy services to other states in delivery these 
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methods. It also provides successful states with more time to work on the other programme 
initiatives (Young 2010).  
 
While this preparatory approach to programme development and implementation is common 
member states, there has sometimes been less understanding of its role in practice. In the 
UK, as part of the Brexit discourse, there have been criticisms of blind compliance on the part 
of the Government or that new legislation is being imposed on the UK by the EU without any 
previous knowledge even where a cursory examination of the EU Council agendas, attendee 
lists, and decisions would show that the length of time that the UK has been involved in 
negotiating each of these issues. Even where the preferred within of delivery has not been 
the one in operation in the UK, then there has been preparation for future implementation 
through Government initiatives. It can be argued that the introduction of new localism (Balls 
2002) was in preparation for the final implementation of subsidiarity in the Lisbon Treaty 
which was expected to be signed in 2005 in time for the 2006-2013 programme period. This 
was delayed by the then UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown until 2007 and this gave the EC a 
further period of consideration for the implementation of sub-state policies for the next 
programme period 2014-2020 (Pires 2010).   
 
A second area of implementation preparation was the establishment of Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs) in 2010 by Eric Pickles. While the application of subsidiarity was 
increasingly embodied in the EU cohesion programmes, in England Whitehall did not favour 
the devolution of resources to the democratically elected local government. This was 
particularly the case when the austerity narrative was such a vital component of the change 
rhetoric of the Conservative Party in the incoming Coalition government (Lowndes and 
Pratchett 2012; Lowndes and Gardiner 2016; Ferry and Murphy 2017). When the UK prepared 
its proposals for LEPS, that are self-appointed, undemocratic bodies without any legal 
underpinning, to be the main implementers and funding recipients of the 2014-2021 
Cohesion programme (HMG 2014a and b), the EC threw out this approach as undemocratic. 
Although the UK Government had to amend its stance on delivery (CEC 2014a), the temporal 
allowance for policy adjustment within the EU meant that the UK had much of this seven your 
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programme period to effect change. In the short term, at least, this left the CO and HMT with 
responsibility for the programme funding and delivery for up to another seven years while 
still using LEPs to deliver growth and European Investment plans. One concession was made 
to introduce one of the EC’s preferred models for delivery, the Integrated Territorial 
Investment strategies in Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly (CIOS 2016).  
 
As the programme for 2014-2020 is being delivered the member states governments are 
working with the EC for the preparation of the next programme for 2021-2026. This will 
include preparing their own domestic policy agendas to align more closely align with what is 
expected in the next programme to reduce transition costs. In this next Cohesion programme 
delivery period, further implementation of both sub-state and territorially based integrated 
programmes are being prepared by the EC.  In the UK it would be expected that the Cabinet 
Office would be preparing the delivery departments for these policy changes and signalling 
any institutional reforms that might be required. Given the UK Government’s commitment in 
the 2014 Partnership Agreement that it would devolve funding and policy leads to local 
government in England in the same way as this has been devolved to Scotland and Wales 
governments, it might be expected that some reforms would be underway. However, with 
the disruption of Brexit would there still be any need to continue with meeting these policy 
commitments? While those changes in institutional structure in favour if devolving funding 
such as the creation of combined authorities with directly elected mayors had begun before 
the Brexit referendum, would there be any need to continue this process of creating larger 
local authorities with more devolved financial powers?  
 
Auto-pilot or risk mitigation – continuing policy delivery despite the Brexit referendum? 
However, as the Government’s delivery departments have been instructed to maintain 
business as usual, it could be expected that they are continuing to prepare for policies and 
programmes that could be rendered null and void post Brexit. Is there any evidence of this 
business as usual approach and what might be underlying drivers of this be on the part of the 
CO which could redirect this activity? Also, is there any other evidence of major programmes 
preparing for operation within the next programme and budget period continuing as if Brexit 
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was not expected to happen? In the next section, two of these policy developments with their 
associated preparation for implementation are considered and this will be followed by a 
discussion as to there is any overriding purpose in this approach or whether they reparent a 
Government too distracted with Brexit matters to make any other changes to apparent 
domestic policy.  The two case studies selected are in policy areas where there would be no 
expected continuation after Brexit – that of Cohesion and Trans European Networks for 
Transport (TEN-T). While there will be some expected continuation of relationships between 
the UK and the EU for example in the application of WTO trade rules and UN environmental 
policies following Brexit, on these two areas, they are likely to be policies lost and future 
delivery expectations, currently being developed within the EU, foregone (Morphet 2017).  
The UK government has stated that in the case of Cohesion policy, that it will take on the 
policy directly. In the case of TEN-T policy, no statement has been made about the future 
relationships between the UK and EU although there are no specific mechanisms for them to 
continue even if EU policy is rolled into UK legislation as they depend on links with other 
member states to be successful.  
 
 
Case study 1: Cohesion policy 
As cumulative policy model that is used within the EU means that the programmes set for 
seven years are expected to build on their immediate predecessors. This means that the 
approach to devolving EU cohesion policy is expected to take a further step in the coming 
programme period. Within the EU Cohesion Regulation 1303/2013, integrated programmes 
particularly for rural areas known as Community Led Local Development (CLLD) have been 
required (CEC 2014). These have built on CLLD programme approaches in the preceding 
programmes and have gained in their role of integrating EU programmes at the local level 
(Thuessen and Nielsen 2014). CLLD programmes are for areas with populations between 
10,000-150,000. The Cohesion Regulation also included a programme model for Functional 
Economic Areas (FEAs) that is set out in its guidance for Integrated Territorial Investments 
(ITIs) (URBACT 2015; CEC 2014c; CEC 2015). The use of ITI is not mandatory in the 2014-2020 
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Cohesion programme period and not all member states have implemented them as options 
in the current period (CEMR 2015). The only example in the UK is in Cornwall (CIOS 2016).  
 
Notwithstanding Brexit, if the UK was implementing a change in devolution to local 
authorities in England as a response to the agreement with the EC in 2014, there has to be 
some mechanism to remove, reform or replace the LEPs to meet these agreed obligations 
However, the Government’s approach to establishing several Combined Authorities in 2017 
(Sandford 2016) that represent quasi-FEAs, together with the introduction of  a range of small 
scale piecemeal local government reorganizations into larger units  (eg Buckinghamshire and 
Dorset into unitary authorities and combining district councils in Suffolk) is being 
implemented in a slow albeit continuing way. 
 
Within the EC, there is increasingly likelihood that in the 2021-2026 Cohesion programme 
that the use of ITI programmes will be adopted across all the EU’s territory. While the 
Strategic Economic Plans (SEPs) and European Structural and Investment Fund programmes 
(ESIFs) prepared by English LEPs under the centralised approach in the 2014-20 agreement, 
would be one mechanism to attempt to introduce this role, there remains a series of issues 
to be resolved. The first is for institutional reform moving at a faster pace so that LEPs can be 
replaced by democratically accountable bodies. Secondly, there remains a dissonance 
between the LEP processes for SEPs and ESIFs and the local authority led local planning regime 
which is responsible for land use planning within their areas.  While local plans are required 
to acknowledge the role of LEPs and the contents of SEPs and ESIFs in their local plan 
preparation, these relationships are not the only determinants of their plan policies, that are 
legally binding within decision making on land use. One approach to meet the commitment 
made by the UK to the EU in 2014 to make put cohesion plans within the scope of democratic 
decision making could be to place the SEPs and ESIFs within the local plan system particularly 
through an expansion of the infrastructure delivery programmes that all local plans are 
required to include. Within Combined Authorities, the directly elected mayors have a range 
of powers that vary with some having strategic planning powers. Further these Combined 
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Authorities, both established and being agreed, may include most of the English population, 
although they do not include most of the land area.  
 
While the government could move quickly to nudging all local authorities to establish 
combined authorities, following an early push to do so through bidding in 2016, there may 
not be enough capacity in Whitehall to manage this politically while it is implementing Brexit. 
But this is also to conclude that the Government wishes to continue this programme when 
there may be no further need to comply with these agreements or the expectations of future 
EU programmes after March 2019. However, it appears that the Government is continuing 
the path of both complying with its 2014 agreement with the EC and preparing for the next 
programme period. The draft revised National Planning Policy Framework (RNPPF) launched 
by the Prime Minister (MHCLG 2018) there are proposals to change the local planning system 
into one that more closely aligns to that set out in CLLD and ITI guidelines with an increased 
focus on delivery.  
This approach is a major change in the structures of local planning systems which have been 
in place since 1991. It proposes that each local authority should have a strategic plan with its 
neighbours. The areas defined for these plans are not specified for the whole of England 
although they will be for combined authority areas where these exist regardless of whether 
directly elected mayors have planning powers. It could be assumed that the existing LEP areas 
will form the underpinning for these strategic geographies. The mechanisms for achieving the 
governance structures for these new strategic plans outside combined authorities are also 
not specified. These could be based on local authority joint committees or could hasten the 
implementation of more combined authorities in practice. As Townsend (2017) notes, in 
2015, many local authorities made bids to central government to become combined 
authorities and for the most part these bids have been lying dormant since their submission. 
It is possible that these could be resurrected, and local authorities offered some financial 
inducements for their implementation as part of these reform processes.  
 
This major reform of the scale of plan making has not had much public preparation or 
underpinning narrative, although the role of local plans has been consistently destabilised by 
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successive governments. In the proposed approach, the strategic plan will provide a 
combined approach to housing delivery and introduce a consistent approach across England 
at this scale. By introducing a strategic planning mechanism, accompanied by the existing 
local and neighbourhood planning systems, it is possible to see long term government 
preparation for this change to introduce ITI within democratic control and broaden the role 
of CLLD for smaller areas. This approach will meet the requirements of the agreements made 
in 2014 to achieve this democratic switch by 2020. In this we can see the UK’s exit velocity to 
meet the its commitments for reform and devolution so the current programme bur also to 
prepare for the forthcoming EU Cohesion programme from 2021 onwards.  
 
So why has this approach been taken when Brexit suggests that there may be no continuing 
need to company with institutional restructuring at sub-state level in England? The first 
reason could be that this is a heavily invested policy through political narratives and has the 
support of HMT which needs to meet EU macroprudential and OECD guidance on housing 
delivery. Secondly, it could be that this approach to work at FEA and neighbourhood level 
meets the requirements of the UN’s SDG goal 11 on the New Urban Agenda to which the UK  
is committed and requires spatial delivery plans at these scales. It could be that the 
government is just on auto pilot and continuing with this approach is easier in the Brexit 
period that changing policies. Alternatively, it could be a risk mitigation measure to ensure 
that whatever outcome of the current Brexit negotiations, remain or another form of treaty 
relationship, then at least this policy will be in alignment with forthcoming EC programme 
expectations.  
 
 
Case study 2: Trans-European Networks for transport  
The trans-European networks for transport (TEN-T) were established in 1996b following an 
intervention by the UK Prime Minister John Major when the UK held the Presidency of the EU 
in 1992. The expected expansion of the EU through the accession for many new members 
from the eastern states of Europe, posed both an opportunity and a challenge for the existing 
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members and their budgetary arrangements. The opportunity was the EC’s access to skilled 
labour at lower pay rates that could provide support to the declining populations of the 
existing member states. In the UK, subsequent Blair governments used this opportunity to 
increase the size of the economy and the population through increasing migration and birth-
rates at a time when these where in decline elsewhere the EU.  
 
However, there was also a key challenge for exiting member states. To access the potential 
for the existing members of the EU by offering goods to new consumer markets in the east 
there needed to be considerable investments in the provision of infrastructure, particularly 
transport. While transport had been a competence on the EU since the Treaty of Rome, much 
of the EU’s focus had been on regulations and interconnections which would support the 
customs union and single market. Where there had been capital investment in direct 
provision of infrastructure, this had been focused through the structural and then cohesion 
funds in countries where there was both lower GDP and lower income. For many years Spain, 
Portugal and Ireland had been main recipients of these funds. In recognising the need to 
expand the EU’s membership it was also recognized that these existing member states would 
no longer be the poorest in the EU. To respond to both issues, Major proposed changes to 
the cohesion funding approach and the establishment a major new transport investment 
programme. In the change to cohesion policy, this introduced a move to provide more loans 
than grants. In transport, it was proposed that the EU should designate some strategic routes 
across its existing and expanded territory that would both allow some projects for existing 
member states but would also include projects for improvements in the accession states, 
through a focus in fixing missing links and bottle necks within these newly designated routes 
or corridors as they were to be known. 
 
The TEN-T Regulation and its accompanying investment programme was agreed in 1995 
which the alignment of these newly defined corridors being east west.  Each corridor was to 
be supported by three modes of transport along the whole route. Each corridor was 
supported by a specific group and programme within which member states could identify 
their preferred projects for dealing with missing links and bottle necks. The programmes 
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allowed for EU funding contributions to develop these projects through successive stages into 
delivery with some eventual contribution for the projects selected for implementation. The 
proportion of EU support was higher in accession states. In the UK, the TEN-T corridor from 
Crete to Donegal was primarily seen as improvements to the A14 road from Harwich to 
Holyhead with significant upgrading on sections of the route but also included projects such 
as the Cambridge guided busway. The UK benefitted substantially from these programmes 
(DfT 2012; CEC 2013) and even where there was no direct funding contribution, loans were 
available through the European Investment Bank (EIB 2018) and latterly the Juncker 
investment fund from 2010. 
 
While the development of this first programme of TEN-T routes has been modified, the east 
west orientation has remained as an operational objective. Following the economic crisis in 
2008, there were unemployment problems in all the member states with issues of youth 
unemployment in Greece and Spain. It was agreed that TEN-T should be reviewed. The 
resulting regulation 1315/2103, agreed that there should be a new set of set designated 
strategic routes across the EU’s territory, this time linking areas north and south. In the UK 
the North to Mediterranean corridor was adopted as one of 13 designated. At the same time, 
in line with integrating policies and programmes between DGs in the EU and as part of its shift 
to the territorial basis of policy and away from silos, the 2013 regulation also included the 
provision to establish a second network of designated routes. In this case, the strategic 
networks designated in 1996 and 2013 were known as core routes while the new network 
would be designated as a comprehensive network. The comprehensive network was to fit 
within the core network, to make links to it and to improve more sub-state interconnectivity 
between FEAs. There was also a connection between these comprehensive routes when 
designated and EU sustainable urban mobility policies at the local level.  
 
In determining this new comprehensive network, the intention expressed in Regulations 
1315/2013 was that this should be designated on or by 2030. The process of developing the 
comprehensive route networks was to be within member states and proposals were to be put 
forward to the EC. While there this was a relatively long lead in time to achieve these new 
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comprehensive networks designations, the UK moved forward on these proposals rapidly 
with the focus on a defining the comprehensive networks structure in England.  The 
institutional apparatus of LEPs provided an opportunity for the creation of a policy 
progression without any rapid turn but there was also a need to consider the justification of 
such comprehensive networks. This had to be considered in the light as the EC’s growing 
interest in both FEA policies and its Urban Agenda together espoused with the OECD.  In terms 
of identifying the potential new comprehensive networks in England, the LEPs would not be 
accepted as the main instigators within the EU framework while their areas were too small 
for the scale envisaged.  
The UK’s institutional response was to create the National Infrastructure Commission (NIC) in 
2015, with an independent chair and a remit that specifically lasted longer than an individual 
Parliamentary term of five years. Lord Adonis a former transport minister in the Labour 
government was given the role of chairman and he was supported by a range if independent 
commissioners and experts. They started work by commissioning a range of studies in 2016 
(NIC 2018). 
 
When the result of the Brexit referendum was known, this provided some problems for the 
role of the NIC. It had begun its work, that included ways in which it was going to progress the 
designation of EU Comprehensive routes but the key issues facing the Government, 
specifically the CO and HMT, was that the NIC had never been overtly associated with the 
TEN-T programme and the EU. The immediate response of the government was to freeze the 
work of the NIC while the next moves were considered. When the NIC was relaunched in 
December 2016, it was no longer am independent body but an agency of HMT. The 
Government had decided that it would continue with its work as if nothing had happened and 
the studies including that for Oxford Milton Keynes and Cambridge Corridor should be 
continued. To these were added the corridor studies led by Transport for the North that had 
been developed during this period (TfN 2018). In both cases, the development of 
comprehensive networks is seen as part of wider spatial investment programmes.  
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While there might be some arguments for the continuation for the core corridors designated 
within TEN-T if the UK leaves the EU, not least to act as a land bridge for the Ireland while 
other methods such as short sea shipping are enhanced, it could be argued that this specific 
policy for the designation of comprehensive corridors was less necessary. So why is it 
continuing? There are several arguments that can be posited. The first is that it was too 
difficult to stop the preparations for the designation of these corridors in political terms and 
what arguments could be given? Secondly, a tacit recognition that the role of this policy is 
anchored in an EU regulation would open wider considerations of the basis of all strategic 
transport policy in the public domain although the evidence is in plain sight for those who 
wish to find it. There could be a consideration of wider policy relationships post-Brexit where 
the UK may be closer to the OECD which is in favour of this kind of investment linking together 
FEAs. Another reason may be that it is easier to keep the Department for Transport busy in 
developing these policies as it would be difficult to find a replacement and to justify this policy 
turn. In this case, continuing with the development of the comprehensive networks policy on 
‘auto pilot’ is a reasonable approach to parking an issue until future likely approaches are 
better known. The last approach that can be considered is that this policy continuation is part 
of a risk mitigation strategy against the UK’s future relationships with the EU. If the 
Withdrawal Bill 2018 succeeds in transferring EU Regulations and Directives into UK law, then 
there is still a need to implement this regulation until some replacement approach is found. 
Further, the UK may not leave the EU in ways that the PM has suggested, that is there may 
be continued alignment of policy and legislation between the EU and the UK. 
 
Conclusions  
This paper has considered the UK government’s approach to existing EU policies and 
programmes within the context of Brexit. It has reviewed two specific programmes – for 
Cohesion and Trans European Networks that could be foregone when the UK leaves the EU 
(Morphet 2017). It has demonstrated that the UK Government is continuing with preparation 
for the delivery of these programmes both to meet existing commitments made in 2013/2104 
and that it is preparing for the future EC programmes 2020-2026. It has examined the possible 
reasons for this policy continuation. These may be because the UK core executive is too busy 
to manage ways to change course form the policy trajectory that existed prior to the 2016 
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Brexit referendum. Another consideration may be that the core executive is uncertain as to 
whether or on what terms the UK will leave the EU and the continuation of meeting existing 
commitments and preparing for for the period post-Brexit on a status quo basis is a risk 
mitigation strategy. The separation between new staff being recruited to work on Brexit in 
the DfT and no new staff being recruited to work on Brexit in MHCLG suggest that this is likely 
to be a risk mitigation strategy against the future relationship between the EU and the UK 
rather than an auto-pilot approach. 
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